

Honorable Benjamin H. Settle

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT TACOMA

CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF )  
KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON, )  
 )  
Plaintiff, )  
 )  
v. )  
 )  
MYRON "MIKE" KREIDLER, in his official )  
capacity as Insurance Commissioner for the State )  
of Washington; JAY INSLEE, in his official )  
capacity as Governor of the State of Washington, )  
 )  
Defendants. )

Civil No. 3:19-cv-05181  
**PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND  
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT**  
  
NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:  
Friday, June 7, 2019  
  
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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1 Plaintiff Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington, moves under Fed. R. Civ.  
2 P. 65 to preliminarily enjoin Defendants' enforcement of Senate Bill 6219 (codified as RCW §  
3 48.43.072 and .073), facially and as-applied to Cedar Park, because it violates the First and  
4 Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Cedar Park is a non-profit Christian  
5 church that believes participation in, facilitation of, or payment for abortion or abortifacient drugs  
6 and devices (collectively referred to as "abortion") in any circumstance is forbidden. Many of the  
7 Church's ministries, such as assisting foster children and embryo adoption, are built around this  
8 core teaching. But SB 6219 forces Cedar Park to provide insurance coverage for abortion, in  
9 violation of these beliefs. Cedar Park's current group health insurance plan must be renewed by  
10 August 1, 2019. On that date, SB 6219 will become enforceable by Defendants against Cedar Park,  
11 subjecting the Church to fines and its pastor and other leaders to criminal liability and up to 364  
12 days of jail time. Cedar Park therefore requires relief before that date.

### 13 INTRODUCTION

14 Since *Roe v. Wade* was decided in 1973, Americans have long shared a value that  
15 government should never force churches to participate in or facilitate abortion in violation of their  
16 religious beliefs. Even when the federal government mandated that all employers provide  
17 abortifacients as part of their employee health plans, the government still had the good sense to  
18 exempt churches. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).

19 The State of Washington has emphatically rejected such religious plurality. In 2018, the  
20 State acted in concert with abortion advocates to draft, promote, pass, and implement SB 6219,  
21 which requires Washington employers to provide abortion and abortifacient coverage in their  
22 employee health plans. Tellingly, while SB 6219 contains numerous exemptions, none adequately  
23 protect churches like Cedar Park, who believe that abortion, and any participation in, facilitation  
24 of, or payment for abortion, is a grave sin. First Amended Verified Complaint ("VC") ¶ 29.  
25 Churches and other religious organizations are forced to choose between their sincerely held  
26 religious beliefs and crippling government penalties, including jail time.



1 The State of Washington cannot compel a church to affirm a practice repugnant to its  
2 beliefs through criminal and civil penalties without surviving strict scrutiny—the most demanding  
3 constitutional test. *See Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). Because SB 6219 cannot  
4 pass this exacting test, it violates numerous constitutional protections.

5 Washington’s abortion mandate is not neutral or generally applicable making it subject to  
6 strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. *See Emp. Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith*,  
7 494 U.S. 872 (1990). SB 6219 is also subject to strict scrutiny because it requires Cedar Park to  
8 violate long-established historical religious practices involving the sanctity of human life and  
9 opposition to abortion, and because it violates the hybrid-rights doctrine of *Smith* that the Ninth  
10 Circuit recognized in *Miller v. Reed*, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999).

11 SB 6219 fails strict scrutiny’s narrowly tailored compelling interest test for three,  
12 independent reasons. First, myriad exemptions eliminate any argument that the law is narrowly  
13 tailored. *See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (stating  
14 that a law “cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of ‘the highest order’” where the existing  
15 exemptions already permit “appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest”)(quoting *Florida*  
16 *Star v. B.J.F.*, 491 U.S. 524, 541–542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in  
17 judgment) (citation omitted)). Second, forcing a church to pay for abortion coverage serves no  
18 *rational*—let alone compelling—government interest. And third, there are a multitude of less  
19 restrictive alternatives that Washington can pursue before compelling churches to violate their  
20 religious beliefs. Restriction of the right to free exercise “must be a last—not first—resort.”  
21 *Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.*, 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).

22 SB 6219 fails for many other reasons, including because it violates the church autonomy  
23 doctrine of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the  
24 Establishment Clause. And because Cedar Park will be subject to irreparable harm of jail time and  
25 fines when the Church’s health plan comes up for renewal on August 1, 2019, preliminary  
26 injunctive relief is warranted.

27

**FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

**I. Plaintiff Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington**

Cedar Park Assembly of God has been serving Bothell and the greater Eastside of the Seattle area for nearly 50 years. VC ¶ 18. Based on its teaching that all humankind has dignity and value because we are made in God’s image, a substantial part of the Church’s ministry is focused on preserving and celebrating life from its very beginning till its natural end. VC ¶¶ 27-30. Cedar Park hosts an annual service known as “Presentation Sunday” where church leaders and members pray for and support couples experiencing infertility, and it has facilitated almost 1,000 embryo adoptions. *Id.* ¶¶ 34, 36. It supports expectant mothers by partnering with a local pregnancy center and hosting an ultrasound unit on its campus. *Id.* at ¶ 35. And the Church hosts an annual free camp for about 75 children in foster care. *Id.* at ¶ 38. Cedar Park also cares for those at the end of life with its funeral home and chapel. *Id.* at 22. This pro-life focus is over and above the countless other ways the church serves the community through Cedar Park Christian Schools; a university-level ministry program; a counseling program; and various community groups and ministries that enhance the lives of women, men, young adults, and children. VC at ¶¶ 22–23.

Cedar Park has over 600 members, and approximately 1,500 people attend the Church’s weekly worship services across all of its locations. *Id.* at ¶ 19. The Church operates according to its Constitution and Bylaws, including its “Position Regarding Sanctity of Human Life”:

Under the *Imago Dei* principle, all human life is sacred and made by God, in His image. Because all humans are image-bearers, human life is of immeasurable worth in all of its dimensions, including pre-born babies, the aged, the physically or mentally challenged, and every other stage or condition from conception through natural death. As such, we as Christians are called to defend, protect, and value all human life.

*Id.* at ¶ 25. The Church believes and teaches its members and others that abortion ends a human life, and is therefore a violation of the Bible’s command against the intentional destruction of the innocent. *Id.* at ¶¶ 27–28. Accordingly, Cedar Park believes and teaches that participation in, facilitation of, or payment for abortion or abortifacient drugs and devices in any circumstance is a

1 grave sin. *Id.* at ¶ 29.

2 Cedar Park expects its employees to abide by and agree with the Church’s moral and ethical  
3 standards, including its religious beliefs and teachings on the sanctity of life, in both their work  
4 life and private life. VC ¶ 31. All employees are required to sign a statement agreeing to abide by  
5 Cedar Park’s standards of conduct, which provides, in pertinent part:

6 Cedar Park employees must conduct their professional and personal  
7 lives in a manner that provides clear evidence of a Christian life and  
8 character that commends the Gospel, strengthens the Church and  
9 honors God. *Cedar Park expects its employees to refrain from  
10 behavior that conflicts or appears inconsistent with evangelical  
11 Christian standards as determined in the sole and absolute  
12 discretion of Cedar Park.... Cedar Park expects all of its employees  
13 to strive toward living a life that reflects the values, mission, and  
14 faith of Cedar Park.*

15 *Id.* at ¶ 32 (emphasis added).

16 The Church promotes the physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being of its employees  
17 and their families by offering health insurance to its employees. VC ¶ 39. Maternity care is an  
18 integral part of this commitment. *Id.* at ¶ 45. Cedar Park believes that it has a religious obligation  
19 to provide for the personal needs of its employees, which includes the provision of health insurance  
20 coverage (with maternity care). *Id.* at ¶ 41. Because of its religious beliefs, Cedar Park offers health  
21 insurance coverage to its employees in a way that does not cause it to pay for abortions or  
22 abortifacient drugs and devices, such as emergency contraception and intrauterine devices. *Id.* at  
23 ¶ 47. Its current group insurance plan excludes coverage for these items. *Id.* Paying premiums or  
24 fees for any plan that covers these procedures or items, whether expressly or surreptitiously under  
25 another label like “overhead expense,” would violate Cedar Park’s beliefs regarding the sanctity  
26 of life. Smith Decl. at ¶ 4.

27 Cedar Park has about 185 employees who are eligible for health insurance coverage. VC ¶  
20. Group health insurance is the only viable way for the Church to provide coverage consistent  
with its call to care for its employees and its legal obligations under the Patient Protection and  
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). *Id.* at ¶ 42. Cedar Park has evaluated becoming self-insured and

1 determined that it is not a viable option. It would cost the Church roughly \$243,125 annually, and  
2 that number is expected to double within the next several years due to increase in plan use. *Id.* at  
3 ¶ 43. More importantly, switching to a self-insurance plan is likely to have a catastrophic effect on  
4 employees and family members currently battling serious illness. For instance, one child of an  
5 employee will need a kidney transplant soon and the Church would not have the ability to pay for  
6 it if self-insured. Smith Decl. at ¶ 6. And an employee undergoing expensive cancer treatment  
7 would likely no longer be covered should the Church switch to self-insurance on August 1. Smith  
8 Decl. at ¶ 7. Group health insurance is Cedar Park’s only viable option to fulfill its commitment  
9 to its employees. VC at ¶ 44.

## 10 **II. Washington Senate Bill 6219**

### 11 **A. SB 6219 requires churches to provide insurance coverage for abortion.**

12 In 2018, the State of Washington passed and implemented SB 6219, codified at RCW  
13 § 48.43.073, which provides that “if a health plan issued or renewed on or after January 1, 2019,  
14 provides coverage for maternity care or services, the health plan must also provide a covered  
15 person with substantially equivalent coverage to permit the abortion of a pregnancy.” *See also*, VC  
16 Ex. A at § 3(1). Remarkably, even a health plan of a church committed to the sanctity of unborn  
17 life like Cedar Park “may not limit in any way a person’s access to services related to the abortion  
18 of a pregnancy.” *Id.* at § 3(2)(a). SB 6219 further requires all insurance plans issued or renewed  
19 on or after January 1, 2019, to provide coverage for “[a]ll contraceptive drugs, devices, and other  
20 products, approved by the federal food and drug administration, including over-the-counter  
21 contraceptive drugs, devices, and products, approved by the federal food and drug administration,”  
22 and “[t]he consultations, examinations, procedures, and medical services that are necessary to  
23 prescribe, dispense, insert, deliver, distribute, administer, or remove the drugs, devices, and other  
24 services” related to the same. VC Ex. A at § 2(1), codified at RCW § 48.43.072.

1           **B.     SB 6219 includes numerous broad exemptions, but only a narrow religious**  
2           **exemption that fails to protect Cedar Park.**

3           SB 6219 and the other state laws informing its application contain numerous exemptions.  
4           Thirteen different types of insurance plans are exempted from the definition of “health plan,”  
5           including plans for the disabled, self-funded plans, and student-only plans. RCW § 48.43.005(27).  
6           SB 6219 also exempts plans if compliance with the legislation might jeopardize federal funding to  
7           Washington. VC Ex. A at § 3(5). And the law does not apply to employer-sponsored plans that do  
8           not provide maternity-care coverage. *Id.* at 3(1).

9           Washington state law also affords a comprehensive exemption for a select class of religious  
10          health care providers, carriers, and facilities. RCW § 48.43.065(2)(a). But it provides only a  
11          narrow, inadequate exemption for other religious organizations like Cedar Park.

12          **C.     The penalties for violating SB 6219 include fines and jail time.**

13          Cedar Park, as well as its pastor, board members, and other leaders are subject to fines and  
14          even jail time of up to 364 days for failing to comply with SB 6219:

15                   [A]ny person violating any provision of [the insurance] code is  
16                   guilty of a gross misdemeanor and will, upon conviction, be fined  
17                   not less than ten dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or  
18                   imprisoned for not more than three hundred sixty-four days, or both,  
                    in addition to any other penalty or forfeiture provided herein or  
                    otherwise by law.

19          RCW § 48.01.080.

20          **III.    The Effect of SB 6219 on Cedar Park**

21          Because Cedar Park provides comprehensive maternity care coverage in its employee  
22          health care plan, SB 6219 requires the Church to provide abortion coverage. VC ¶ 63. Defendants  
23          make no allowance for the religious freedom of religious employers and churches, such as Cedar  
24          Park, who object to paying for, facilitating access to, or providing insurance coverage for abortion  
25          under any circumstance. *Id.* at ¶ 64. Given the number of Cedar Park’s full-time employees, the  
26          ACA requires the Church to provide health insurance to its employees, including full coverage for  
27

1 maternity care. *Id.* at ¶¶ 65–66. Failure to provide health insurance in accordance with ACA  
 2 requirements subjects Cedar Park to crippling monetary penalties. *Id.* at ¶ 67. SB 6219 imposes a  
 3 burden on Cedar Park’s ability to recruit and retain employees, and it places Cedar Park at a  
 4 competitive disadvantage by creating uncertainty as to whether it will be able to offer group health  
 5 insurance in the future. *Id.* at ¶ 72.

6 In sum, SB 6219 impermissibly forces Cedar Park to choose between violating state law  
 7 and violating its deeply held religious beliefs by paying for abortion coverage. And without  
 8 injunctive relief, Cedar Park will suffer irreparable harm beginning on August 1, 2019.

### 9 ARGUMENT

10 In considering a preliminary injunction, the Court reviews whether a plaintiff is “likely to  
 11 succeed on the merits, . . . likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,”  
 12 whether “the balance of equities tips in [its favor],” and whether “an injunction is in the public  
 13 interest.” *Angelotti Chiropractic, Inc. v. Baker*, 791 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting *All.*  
 14 *for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011)). “Serious questions going to  
 15 the merits and hardship balance that tips sharply towards plaintiff can also support issuance of a  
 16 preliminary injunction, so long as there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and the injunction is in  
 17 the public interest.” *Baker*, 791 F.3d at 1081 (quoting *Cottrell*, 632 F.3d at 1132).

#### 18 **I. Cedar Park is likely to succeed on the merits of its Free Exercise claim primarily** 19 **because SB 6219 is not neutral and generally applicable.**

20 Free exercise jurisprudence is largely governed by two Supreme Court cases: *Emp’t Div.*  
 21 *v. Smith* and *Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*. An “across-the-board  
 22 criminal prohibition” on possession of the hallucinogenic drug peyote was upheld in *Smith* because  
 23 it was neutral and generally applicable. 494 U.S. at 879, 884. Three years later the Court struck  
 24 down a targeted ordinance prohibiting the killing of animals for religious reasons, but allowing it  
 25 in almost all other circumstances, including hunting and slaughterhouses. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 543-  
 26 44. Read together, these seminal cases and their progeny describe the outer limits of the  
 27 constitutionality of government restrictions on religious liberty as well as the legal principles used

1 to analyze all free exercise claims.

2 The most important of these principles is that laws targeting religion are only the baseline  
3 of what the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects against. In other words, “[b]ad  
4 motive may be one way to pursue a violation, but first and foremost, *Smith-Lukumi* is about  
5 objectively unequal treatment of religion and analogous secular activities.” Douglas Laycock,  
6 *Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes*  
7 *but Missing the Liberty*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 210 (2004). Laws burdening religiously-  
8 motivated conduct are also subject to the highest level of scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause  
9 when they lack neutrality or general applicability. *Smith*, 494 U.S. at 879.

10 Cedar Park is likely to succeed on its Free Exercise Claim because SB 6219 is targeted at  
11 religion, not neutral, and not generally applicable.

12 **A. SB 6219 imposes an impermissible burden on Cedar Park’s exercise of**  
13 **religion.**

14 Cedar Park believes that abortion ends a human life and therefore teaches that participation  
15 in, facilitation of, or payment for abortion in any circumstance is a grave sin. This includes indirect  
16 payments. VC at ¶ 29; *Smith Decl.* at ¶ 4. SB 6219’s requirement that the Church pay for abortion  
17 coverage violates Cedar Park’s religious beliefs. The religious exemption in RCW § 48.43.065(3)  
18 does not alleviate this burden. It authorizes the insurance carrier to increase Cedar Park’s premiums  
19 to cover the cost of abortions not expressly included in the plan. *See Plaintiff’s Opp. to MTD* at 4-  
20 8.

21 Accordingly, SB 6219 renders “unlawful the religious practice itself,” by directly requiring  
22 Cedar Park to provide insurance coverage for abortion under threat of criminal liability and jail  
23 time. *See Braunfeld v. Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). This is a prototypical substantial burden.<sup>1</sup>

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24  
25  
26 <sup>1</sup> To trigger Free Exercise protection, Cedar Park need only show that its religion is burdened, not that it is substantially  
27 burdened. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 531 (laws are subject to the Free Exercise Clause even if they only have “the incidental  
effect of *burdening* a particular religious practice.”) (emphasis added). Regardless, SB 6219 substantially burdens  
Cedar Park Church’s free exercise of religion.

1           **B.     SB 6219 is neither neutral nor generally applicable.**

2           SB 6219’s network of exemptions and the State’s intent to require religious organizations  
3 to provide insurance coverage for abortion despite their deep religious objections to doing so,  
4 render SB 6219 neither neutral nor generally applicable. The statute fails this test because it:

5           (1) Provides **exemptions** for secular conduct, but not for similar religious conduct.  
6 *Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark*, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (1999)  
7 (Alito, J.);

8           (2) Is **gerrymandered** so that it singles out religious conduct for disfavored treatment.  
9 *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 532-40;

10          (3) Applies **differential treatment** among religions or types of religious organizations. *id.*  
11 at 536; and

12          (4) Was enacted with **discriminatory intent** or hostility toward religious conduct,  
13 *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n*, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729-31 (2018).

14                   **1.     SB 6219 provides secular exemptions that undermine Defendants’**  
15                   **stated interest in providing women access to health benefits.**

16           SB 6219 is not generally applicable because it has a wide variety of exemptions—all of  
17 which significantly undermine the Defendants’ stated interest in providing women with better  
18 access to health benefits. “[S]elective laws that fail to pursue legislative ends with equal vigor  
19 against both religious practice and analogous secular conduct are not governed by *Smith*; such  
20 underinclusive laws are subject to surpassingly strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause and  
21 *Lukumi*.” Richard F. Duncan, *Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise*, 3 U. Pa. J. Const.  
22 850, 883 (2001).

23           Even a single exemption undermining a state’s asserted interest eliminates general  
24 applicability. *Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church v. Unsworth*, 556 F.3d 1021, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009)  
25 (Noonan, J., concurring) (stating that restrictions on church’s speech on referendum issue were not  
26 neutral and generally applicable where there was an exception for newspapers); *Fraternal Order*  
27 *of Police*, 170 F.3d at 366 (striking down a prohibition on police officers growing beards because



1 it allowed a medical exemption); *Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside*, 366 F.3d 1214,  
 2 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a single exemption for clubs and lodges to zoning district  
 3 limited to retail shopping “violate[d] the principles of neutrality and general applicability because  
 4 private clubs and lodges endanger [the town’s] interest in retail synergy as much or more than  
 5 churches and synagogues”).<sup>2</sup>

6 There are numerous exemptions here: Washington law exempts 13 different types of  
 7 insurance plans from the definition of “health plans” including temporary plans, plans for the  
 8 disabled, and student-only plans. RCW § 48.43.005(27).<sup>3</sup> SB 6219 also allows for an exemption if  
 9 necessary to avoid violating federal conditions on state funding. VC Ex. A at § 3(5). And it exempts  
 10 plans that do not provide comprehensive maternity care coverage. *Id.* at § 3(1).

11 All of these exemptions undermine Defendants’ stated purpose of protecting women’s  
 12 access to benefits, especially for reproductive health. MTD at 19. If exempting religious  
 13 organizations like Cedar Park from paying for abortion undercuts that interest, so does exempting  
 14 colleges and universities that have health insurance policies for their students. The same is true for  
 15 plans that do not cover maternity, may only exist for a year, solely cover people with disabilities,  
 16 or that might jeopardize state funding.

17 Importantly, any independent secular reasons for exempting these plans are not considered  
 18 in this analysis. “In determining whether a particular law is under inclusive, the relevant  
 19 governmental purposes are those that justify the scheme of restrictions, not those that justify the  
 20 exemptions or selective coverage.” *Duncan*, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. at 869. For example, the City of  
 21 Hialeah had the same independent, secular public health interest in regulating disposal of garbage  
 22 from restaurants as it did in disposal of sacrificed animals. Yet the Court held the ordinance’s  
 23

24 <sup>2</sup> Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that one exemption does not affect general applicability, relying on  
 25 *Stormans v. Wiesman*, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). MTD at 18. But here there are many exemptions and the  
 language quoted by Defendants is from that court’s individualized exemption analysis, which has no application to  
 the categorical exemptions at issue in this case.

26 <sup>3</sup> The fact that these exemptions are contained in a related statute is irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis.  
 27 *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 526, 537, 539, 544-45 (analyzing the entire body of Florida law on the treatment of animals in  
 assessing general applicability).

1 failure to restrict restaurant garbage the same way it did animal sacrifice rendered it underinclusive  
2 and therefore not generally applicable. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 544-45. Otherwise, “the requirement  
3 to general applicability would be entirely vacuous” because “every law is generally applicable to  
4 whatever it applies to.” Laycock, 118 HARV. L. REV. at 207.

5 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in *Stormans* confirms this point. It focused on whether the  
6 categorical exemptions there undermined the government’s stated purpose for the law at issue. 794  
7 F.3d 1080. And for good reason. “[C]ategories of selection are of paramount concern when a law  
8 has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 542.

9 [T]he Court’s concern [with] the prospect of the government’s deciding that secular  
10 motivations are more important than religious motivations . . . is only further  
11 implicated when the government does not merely create a mechanism for  
12 individualized exemptions, but instead, actually creates a categorical exemption for  
individuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a religious  
objection.

13 *Fraternal Order of Police*, 170 F.3d at 365.

14 The same health interests Defendants use to justify SB 6219 are undermined by the  
15 categorical exemption of multiple other plans. There is no reason why the state is any less  
16 interested in the access to health care for women who are students or disabled, who only have  
17 access to plans for a limited amount of time, or who work for an employer that does not cover  
18 maternity. By failing to exempt religious plans like Cedar Park’s, Defendants make the  
19 impermissible value judgment that secular reasons for not covering abortion are important enough  
20 to overcome the State’s interest in promoting women’s health, but religious reasons are not. *See*  
21 *Id. at 366.*

## 22 **2. SB 6219 is not neutral in its operation.**

23 “Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and...failure to satisfy one  
24 requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 531.  
25 Justice Scalia, the author of *Smith*, went even further, asserting that neutrality and general  
26 applicability “are not only interrelated, but substantially overlap.” *Id. at 557* (Scalia, J.,  
27

1 concurring). SB 6219 is not neutral because it is gerrymandered to disfavor religious objectors, it  
2 treats religious health care companies more favorably than churches like Cedar Park, and it targets  
3 conscientious objectors like Cedar Park.

4 **a. SB 6219 is impermissibly gerrymandered.**

5 SB 6219’s numerous exemptions eliminate general applicability and indicate it is not neutral.  
6 An impermissible objective of suppressing religious belief is not only assessed facially, but also  
7 from “the effect of a law in its real operation.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 535. A law is impermissibly  
8 gerrymandered against religious individuals like Cedar Park if it favors secular conduct, *id.* at 537,  
9 or “proscribe[s] more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve [its] stated ends.” *Id.* at 538.  
10 SB 6219 suffers from both of these maladies.

11 By offering multiple secular exemptions, Washington has failed to pursue its proffered  
12 objectives “with respect to analogous non-religious conduct,” *See id.* at 546. The First Amendment  
13 prevents Cedar Park and other similarly situated organizations from “being singled out for  
14 discriminatory treatment” by Defendants’ refusal to grant them an exemption that would have no  
15 worse effects on the government’s stated interest than those already approved. *Id.* at 538.  
16 Defendants’ obstinance in this regard “devalues [Cedar Park’s] religious reasons” for objecting to  
17 assisting in the destruction of embryonic life. *See id.* at 537. Providing secular exemptions “while  
18 refusing religious exemptions is sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to trigger  
19 heightened scrutiny under *Smith* and *Lukumi*.” *Fraternal Order of Police*, 170 F.3d at 365.

20 SB 6219 also broadly proscribes more conduct than is necessary to achieve its stated end of  
21 furthering women’s access to healthcare. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 542 (holding that a law hindering  
22 “much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in  
23 [its] defense,” is “not neutral”). Exempting Cedar Park would only affect the church’s employees,  
24 all of whom share the Church’s beliefs about abortion. *See* VC ¶¶ 25–32. Employees specifically  
25 agree to abide by Cedar Park’s bylaws and constitution, including Cedar Park’s “Position  
26 Regarding Sanctity of Human Life” delineating the Church’s beliefs against abortion. *Id.* at ¶ 25.  
27 Forcing Cedar Park to provide abortion coverage that would not be used by its employees makes

1 SB 6219 broader than necessary and further demonstrates it is impermissibly gerrymandered.

2 **b. SB 6219 treats churches less favorably than other religious**  
 3 **organizations.**

4 A second way to prove a law is not neutral is to show that it produces “differential treatment  
 5 of two religions.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 536. Differential treatment of types of religious  
 6 organizations is enough. There is no need to show the government favors one creed over another.  
 7 *Larson v. Valente*, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (striking law treating “well-established  
 8 churches” more favorably than “churches which are new”); *Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver*, 534  
 9 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008) (striking law treating “sectarian” universities more favorably  
 10 than “pervasively sectarian universities”).

11 SB 6219 is codified at RCW § 48.43.072 and .073, which is part of the same statutory  
 12 scheme as Washington’s exemption for religious organizations in RCW § 48.43.065. But this  
 13 exemption still requires Cedar Park to continue to indirectly pay for abortion pursuant to SB 6219  
 14 via increased premiums, while completely exempting health care religious organizations.

15 RCW § 48.43.065 exempts religious organizations like Cedar park subject to the following  
 16 condition: “The provisions of this section shall not result in an enrollee being denied coverage of,  
 17 and timely access to, any service or services excluded from their benefits package as a result of  
 18 their employer’s or another individual’s exercise of the conscience clause in (a) of this subsection.”  
 19 RCW § 48.43.065(3)(b). In other words, if Cedar Park excludes abortion coverage from its  
 20 employee benefit plan, its insurance carrier must still cover abortion for Cedar Park’s employees.  
 21 And subsection (4) provides that an insurance carrier cannot be forced to pay for that additional  
 22 coverage and can charge Cedar Park for it. RCW § 48.43.065(3) and (4). Importantly, the  
 23 Washington Attorney General postulated that the way to solve this conundrum is for the carrier to  
 24 increase the employer’s premium to cover abortion, but to characterize the increase as “an  
 25 administrative, overhead, contingency, or other expense or allowance”. AGO 2002 No. 5.<sup>4</sup> This

26 <sup>4</sup> Interpretation of “Conscientious Objection” Statute Allowing Employers to Refrain from Including Certain Items  
 27 in the Employee Health Care Benefit Package (Aug. 8, 2002), *available at* [https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-](https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/interpretation-conscientious-objection-statute-allowing-employers-refrain-including)  
[opinions/interpretation-conscientious-objection-statute-allowing-employers-refrain-including](https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/interpretation-conscientious-objection-statute-allowing-employers-refrain-including).

1 “solution” would not work for Cedar Park because the Church objects to facilitating abortion both  
2 directly and indirectly, even if it is characterized as an administrative expense. VC at ¶¶ 29, 46;  
3 Smith Decl. at ¶ 4.

4 There is no similar requirement for religious health care providers, carriers, or facilities,  
5 which are exempted from SB 6219 by RCW § 48.43.065(2)(a). The only condition placed on that  
6 exemption says, “The provisions of this section are *not intended* to result in an enrollee being  
7 denied timely access to any service included in the basic health plan services.” RCW §  
8 48.43.065(2)(b) (emphasis added). That condition is satisfied when the *insurance carrier* notifies  
9 enrollees of the lack of coverage and provides them with prompt written information about how  
10 they might access these services. *Id.*

11 Health care providers, religiously sponsored health carriers, and health care facilities that  
12 have a conscientious or moral objection to providing insurance coverage for abortion are  
13 completely exempt without being subject to additional fees. Cedar Park is not, making SB 6219  
14 not neutral. *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n*, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731  
15 (2018) (“The Free Exercise Clause bars even subtle departures from neutrality on matters of  
16 religion.”) (cleaned up).

17 **c. SB 6219 intentionally discriminates against religious**  
18 **organizations like Cedar Park.**

19 Discriminatory intent is not necessary to show lack of neutrality, but it can be an indicator  
20 of an anti-religious objective. “[U]pon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention  
21 stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember  
22 their own high duty to the Constitution and the rights it secures.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 547. “Factors  
23 relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include the historical background of the  
24 decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy  
25 in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements  
26 made by members of the decisionmaking body.” *Masterpiece*, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (cleaned up).

27 Washington legislators specifically requested that SB 6219 be amended to add exemptions

1 for religious organization such as Cedar Park, but those requests were rejected.<sup>5</sup> Moreover,  
 2 Washington State Senator Steve Hobbs, SB 6219’s sponsor, stated that religious organizations can  
 3 sue if they do not want to provide insurance coverage for abortion. Matt Markovich, *Catholic*  
 4 *Bishops of Wash. Ask Gov. Inslee to Veto Abortion Insurance Bill*, KOMO News, Mar. 5, 2018,  
 5 <https://bit.ly/2Uuu5Nf> (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). Responding to religious organizations’ concern  
 6 that SB 6219 would compel them to pay for and facilitate abortions, Senator Hobbs quipped:  
 7 “Health care is about the individual, not about [religious organizations].” *Id.*

8 These contemporaneous statements from the bill’s sponsor, combined with the historical  
 9 background of the statute, indicate that SB 6219 was enacted to target organizations like Cedar  
 10 Park that have religious views requiring it to respect life. The law is not neutral. And its lack of  
 11 neutrality along with the numerous exemptions outlined above make SB 6219 neither neutral nor  
 12 generally applicable. It is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.

13 **C. SB 6219 does not survive strict scrutiny.**

14 Under strict scrutiny, “a law restrictive of religious practice must advance interests of the  
 15 highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 546  
 16 (cleaned up). In applying strict scrutiny, courts “look[ ] beyond broadly formulated interests” and  
 17 instead “scrutinize [ ] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious  
 18 claimants.” *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vogetal*, 546 U.S. 418, 431  
 19 (2006). For a government interest to be compelling, it must combat “the gravest abuses,  
 20 endangering paramount interest[s].” *Sherbert*, 374 U.S. at 406 (cleaned up).

21 **1. SB 6219 does not serve a rational, much less compelling, government**  
 22 **interest.**

23 SB 6219’s various exemptions demonstrate it “cannot be regarded as protecting an interest  
 24 of the highest order” because the existing exemptions permit “appreciable damage to that

25 <sup>5</sup> See Proposed Amendment to Substitute Senate Bill 6219 by Senator O’Ban, *available at* <https://bit.ly/2UtTAye> (last  
 26 accessed Apr. 5, 2019); Proposed Amendment to Substitute Senate Bill 6219 by Senator Shea, *available at*  
 27 <https://bit.ly/2G4krqE> (last accessed Apr. 5, 2019). Both of these proposed amendments would have allowed Cedar  
 Park and other similarly-situated employers to refuse to comply with the provisions of SB 6219 requiring abortion  
 coverage if they object to compliance on the basis of conscience or religion.

1 supposedly vital interest.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 547 (cleaned up). Stated differently, an interest is  
2 not compelling when the government “fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct  
3 producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort.” *Id.* at 546–47. The  
4 underinclusiveness of SB 6219 demonstrated above “is alone enough to defeat” the asserted state  
5 interest. *Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n*, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011); *see also Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at  
6 546–47.

7 In *O Centro*, the government’s ban on hallucinogenic tea was not subject to an exemption.  
8 But the existence of a *single* exemption for peyote in another part of the controlled substances law  
9 indicated no compelling interest justified banning the tea. 546 U.S. 418. The exemptions to SB  
10 6219 are far more vast and varied than in *O Centro*, so the government must show that “granting  
11 the requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer the  
12 program.” *Id.* at 435. Washington cannot do so because it has “seriously compromised” SB 6219’s  
13 universality through multiple exemptions.

14 Moreover, the only people affected by an exemption for Cedar Park would be its  
15 employees, all of whom share the Church’s beliefs about abortion. *See* VC ¶¶ 25–32. Forcing  
16 Cedar Park to pay for abortion coverage for people who will not use it defies common sense. The  
17 government does not have a *rational*—much less compelling—interest in forcing a pro-life church  
18 to provide abortion coverage for its pro-life employees.

19 **2. SB 6219 is not narrowly tailored, nor is it the least restrictive means of**  
20 **accomplishing Washington’s stated interest.**

21 “A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of  
22 the evil it seeks to remedy” *Frisby v. Schultz*, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (cleaned up). Under strict  
23 scrutiny, the government must also show that SB 6219 “is the least restrictive means of achieving”  
24 its interests. *Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.*, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). If means  
25 less burdensome on religious freedom exist, the government “must use [them].” *United States v.*  
26 *Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).

1 Washington has multiple ways to accomplish its alleged interests without compelling  
2 churches to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. First and foremost, it could provide  
3 religious organizations an exemption from SB 6219 that does not require them to facilitate abortion  
4 by paying correspondingly higher premiums. This would allow the government to enforce the law  
5 against those who do not object on the basis of religion, while respecting the religious beliefs of  
6 churches like Cedar Park. The government has already demonstrated it can make such an  
7 exemption. Religious health care providers, health carriers, and health care facilities are excused  
8 without having to pay anything to subsidize the conduct that violates their convictions. RCW  
9 § 48.43.065(2)(a); *accord Burwell v. Hobby Lobby*, 573 U.S. 682, 730–31 (2014) (noting that the  
10 government had demonstrated its ability to provide an exemption to the Petitioners because it had  
11 granted such an exemption to a different class of religious objectors). Moreover, Washington law  
12 completely exempts 13 different types of health care plans by excluding them from the definition  
13 of “health plan”. RCW § 48.43.005(27). This provision should be extended to Cedar Park and  
14 other similarly situated religious employers. Finally, the government itself could provide abortion  
15 coverage directly to employees whose health plans exclude coverage of abortion.

16 All these options are “workable,” *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003), and much  
17 “less restrictive” of religious freedom, *Playboy*, 529 U.S. at 824. The abortion mandate in SB  
18 6219 is not narrowly tailored because other, less restrictive, means are available for the State to  
19 achieve its stated interest.

20 **D. SB 6219 violates the Free Exercise Clause because it requires Cedar Park to**  
21 **violate its long-established historical religious beliefs regarding abortion.**

22 SB 6219 further violates the Free Exercise Clause because it requires Cedar Park to violate  
23 long-established historical religious practices involving the sanctity of human life and opposition  
24 to abortion. While satisfying the *Smith* test is a necessary threshold to surviving scrutiny under the  
25 Free Exercise Clause, it is not always sufficient. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the  
26 idea “that any application of a valid and neutral law of general applicability is necessarily  
27 constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.” *Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.*



1 *Comer*, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 n.2 (2017). And there is “no merit” to the assertion that *Smith*  
2 neutrality is sufficient to exclude long-established historical religious practices from Free Exercise  
3 Clause protection. *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC*, 565 U.S. 171,  
4 190 (2012) (unanimously barring application of employment discrimination laws against teacher  
5 in religious school on free exercise grounds, without applying the *Smith* test).

6 In *Hosanna-Tabor*, the Court explained that “*Smith* involved government regulation of  
7 only outward physical acts,” whereas the case before it “concern[ed] government interference with  
8 an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.” *Id.* at 190. “[A]  
9 church’s selection of its ministers,” in other words, “is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote.”  
10 *Id.* Making the same point, the Court recently noted that—notwithstanding what might be required  
11 of *secular* officiants through “neutral and generally applicable” laws—it would be unconstitutional  
12 to compel objecting clergy “to perform [a same-sex wedding] ceremony.” *Masterpiece Cakeshop*,  
13 138 S. Ct. at 1727.

14 The Free Exercise Clause does not permit government to require churches to violate their  
15 long-established historical practice of conforming personnel policies to religious teaching.  
16 Defendants have done just that by coercing Cedar Park to participate in or facilitate abortion  
17 through their employer-sponsored health care plan. This is an additional independent reason why  
18 Cedar Park is likely to succeed on its Free Exercise claim.

19 **E. SB 6219 violates Cedar Park’s hybrid Free Exercise rights because the law**  
20 **violates additional fundamental rights.**

21 SB 6219 is also subject to strict scrutiny under the Ninth Circuit’s recognition of the  
22 “hybrid” effect of the free exercise of religion and equal protection interests at issue here. Under  
23 *Smith*, “strict scrutiny [is] imposed in ‘hybrid situation[s]’ in which a law ‘involve[s] not the Free  
24 Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional  
25 protections,” exempting such “hybrid rights” from *Smith*’s general “rational basis test.” *Miller*,  
26 176 F.3d at 1207 (citing *Smith*, 494 U.S. at 881–82). To establish a hybrid-right claim, a “free  
27 exercise plaintiff must make out a colorable claim that a companion right has been violated.”

1 *Miller*, 176 F.3d at 1207. As discussed in Section III, below, SB 6219 violates the Equal Protection  
2 Clause, and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights doctrine.

3 **F. *Smith* should be overruled.**

4 In *Kennedy v. Bremerton School District*, U.S. Supreme Court No. 18-12, four Justices  
5 concurring in the denial of a petition for certiorari opined that *Smith* “drastically cut back on the  
6 protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause,” implicitly suggesting that a party in a future  
7 case should ask the Court to revisit that decision. 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (0019) (Alito, J., joined by  
8 Thomas, J., Gorsuch, J., and Kavanaugh, J.) Cedar Park acknowledges that this Court lacks the  
9 authority to overrule *Smith*, but Cedar Park preserves that argument for a future appeal, if  
10 necessary. *Smith* is contrary to the original understanding and logic of the First Amendment. *See*  
11 *generally* Michael W. McConnell, *Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision*, 57 U. CHI.  
12 L. REV. 1109 (1990). It should be overruled.

13 **II. Cedar Park is likely to succeed on the merits of its church autonomy claim.**

14 SB 6219 impermissibly interferes with Cedar Park’s internal operating procedures in  
15 violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. History  
16 teaches—and our Constitution recognizes—that religious freedom demands a government that  
17 does not interfere with the internal affairs of religious institutions. *Watson v. Jones*, 80 U.S. 679,  
18 730 (1871). Indeed, in *Smith*, the Supreme Court acknowledged the continuing validity of earlier  
19 cases protecting a church’s right to institutional autonomy—specifically, *Serbian E. Orthodox*  
20 *Diocese v. Milivojevich*, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); *Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull*  
21 *Mem’l Presbyterian Church*, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); and *Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral*, 344 U.S.  
22 94 (1952). *See Smith*, 494 U.S. at 877.

23 Those cases hold that First Amendment protection extends not only to matters of faith, but  
24 also to “church administration,” *Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese*, 426 U.S. at 710, “internal  
25 organization,” *id.* at 713, and “the operation of ... churches,” *Kedroff*, 344 U.S. at 107. In other  
26 words, church autonomy has a carefully defined scope that gives religious organizations and  
27 denominations independence from secular control. Churches have the power to decide for

1 themselves—free of state interference—matters of church governance as well as those of faith and  
2 doctrine. *Kedroff*, 344 U.S. at 116.

3 SB 6219 necessarily interferes with Cedar Park’s internal administration and operations.  
4 Washington orders the Church to provide specific employee benefits—insurance coverage for  
5 abortion—directly at odds with Cedar Park’s religious beliefs. SB 6219 therefore violates the  
6 church autonomy doctrine and is unconstitutional.

7 **III. Cedar Park is likely to succeed on the merits of its Equal Protection claim.**

8 SB 6219 treats similarly situated organizations differently in violation of the Equal  
9 Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The Equal Protection Clause directs that all  
10 persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)  
11 (cleaned up). Distinctions among similarly-situated groups that affect fundamental rights “are  
12 given the most exacting scrutiny,” *Clark v. Jeter*, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988), and discriminatory  
13 intent is presumed, *see Plyler*, 457 U.S. at 216–17 (1982) (“[W]e have treated as presumptively  
14 invidious those classifications that ... impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’”).

15 Washington state law exempts religious health care organizations from paying for  
16 objectionable procedures like abortion, *and* does not condition this exemption on subjecting those  
17 organizations to increased premiums to facilitate those procedures. RCW § 48.43.065(2)(a)(b).  
18 Exempted health care organizations are treated more favorably than religious organizations like  
19 Cedar Park whose exemption is conditioned upon their being subject to a premium increase to pay  
20 for the very items they object to. RCW § 48.43.065 (3) and (4). *See supra* Section I(B)(2)(b).

21 Washington state law also exempts 13 different types of insurance plans from the definition  
22 of “health plans” to which SB 6219 applies, RCW § 48.43.005(27). Some of these are  
23 comprehensive health care plans similar to Cedar Park’s. For example, RCW § 48.43.005(7)(1)  
24 excludes from the definition of “health plan” “short-term limited purpose or duration” and “student  
25 only” health care plans approved by the insurance commissioner following a written request for  
26 exclusion. So schools providing comprehensive health insurance to their students are not required  
27 to comply with SB 6219. There is no constitutionally relevant difference between a church

1 employee benefit plan excluding abortion and a student benefit plan excluding abortion. The same  
 2 is true for a plan that excludes maternity coverage or one that is limited in duration. Washington  
 3 cannot treat these organizations differently absent a showing that SB 6219 meets strict scrutiny.

4 Because Washington treats similarly-situated organizations dissimilarly based on a  
 5 fundamental right (religious freedom), it is subject to strict scrutiny, which it cannot meet. *See*  
 6 Section I.C., above. SB 6219 therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.

7 **IV. Cedar Park is likely to succeed on the merits of its Establishment Clause claim.**

8 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from  
 9 disapproving of or showing hostility toward a particular religion or religion in general. SB 6219  
 10 discriminates between religions organizations like Cedar Park and religious health care  
 11 organizations. Discrimination based on religious status is especially odious because a “proper  
 12 respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a  
 13 course of ‘neutrality’ toward religion.” *Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist*, 413  
 14 U.S. 756, 792–793 (1973).

15 Defendants enacted SB 6219 with full knowledge that many religious organizations object  
 16 strenuously to participating in, paying for, facilitating, or otherwise supporting abortion. Yet no  
 17 exemption is available to religious employers who, like Cedar Park, believe that paying for  
 18 abortion—directly or indirectly—is sinful. Indeed, SB 6219 was designed to make it impossible  
 19 for the Church and other similarly-situated religious employers to comply with their religious  
 20 beliefs. As discussed above, in Section I.B, SB 6219 is not neutral toward religion because it  
 21 contains a vast scheme of exemptions, treats religious organizations like Cedar Park differently,  
 22 and was motivated by the desire to suppress religious conduct. SB 6219 therefore violates the  
 23 Establishment Clause.

24 **V. Cedar Park has fulfilled the remaining preliminary injunction factors.**

25 Without an injunction, Pastor Smith, as well as members of Cedar Park’s board risk a  
 26 criminal conviction resulting in jail time of almost a year (364 days), and fines. RCW § 48.01.080;  
 27 RCW § 9A.08.030(3) (“A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he

1 or she performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation to the same  
2 extent as if such conduct were performed in his or her own name or behalf.”). The irreparable harm  
3 to the ministry and reputation of Cedar Park resulting from its leaders being arrested and jailed is  
4 immeasurable.

5 In addition, loss of constitutional rights for even minimal periods of time is presumed to  
6 be irreparable injury. *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). “[T]he fact that a case raises  
7 serious First Amendment questions compels a finding that there exists ‘the potential for irreparable  
8 injury, or that at the very least the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the movant’s] favor.’”  
9 *Sammartano v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting *Viacom Int’l, Inc.*  
10 *v. FCC*, 828 F. Supp. 741, 744 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional  
11 right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”  
12 *Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss.*, 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 11A  
13 FED. PRAC. AND PROC. CIV. § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)) (cleaned up).

14 There should be no dispute about the balance of equities. A preliminary injunction will  
15 stop Washington’s infringement of Cedar Park’s constitutional rights during the pendency of this  
16 litigation. Conversely, such an injunction will not harm Washington at all. It will merely prevent  
17 the State from imposing abortion coverage for Cedar Park employees—all of whom believe  
18 abortion is murder. And if the State finds it necessary to provide abortion coverage for Cedar  
19 Park’s pro-life employees, it may easily do so by other means.

20 Injunctive relief is in the public interest. There is no public “interest in the enforcement of  
21 an unconstitutional law.” *ACLU v. Ashcroft*, 322 F.3d 240, 251 n.11 (3d Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).  
22 And accommodating Cedar Park does not undermine Washington’s application of the abortion-  
23 coverage mandate to the many other employers in the State who do not share the Church’s religious  
24 objections.

25 Finally, Cedar Park notes that in the Ninth Circuit, when the balance of hardships tips  
26 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, as here, the plaintiff need not show a likelihood of success, only  
27 “serious questions going to the merits.” *Cottrell*, 632 F.3d at 1134–35 (cleaned up). The Church’s

1 Verified Complaint raises numerous serious constitutional questions about Washington  
2 intentionally forcing churches like Cedar Park to provide abortion coverage in violation of  
3 religious beliefs regarding the sanctity of life. And this Court should not permit SB 6219 to  
4 irreparably harm Cedar Park while such serious questions remain unanswered.

5 **CONCLUSION**

6 The government should never force a church to pay for abortions, particularly a church that  
7 dedicates its ministry to protecting and celebrating life from conception. Yet Washington has gone  
8 out of its way to bully Cedar Park and other churches at the behest of the powerful abortion lobby.  
9 The Supreme Court has consistently rejected such hostility toward, and targeting of, people of  
10 faith. Accordingly, Cedar Park respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily enjoin SB 6219's  
11 enforcement, as-applied to Cedar Park and on its face.

12 Respectfully submitted this 13th day of May 2019,

13 By: s/Kristen K. Waggoner  
14 Kristen K. Waggoner (WSBA #27790)  
15 Kevin H. Theriot (AZ Bar #030446)\*  
16 Elissa M. Graves (AZ Bar #030670)\*  
17 ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM  
18 15100 N. 90th Street  
19 Scottsdale, Arizona 85260  
20 Telephone: (480) 444-0020  
21 Facsimile: (480) 444-0025  
22 Email: kwaggoner@adflegal.org  
23 ktheriot@adflegal.org  
24 egraves@adflegal.org

25 David A. Cortman (GA Bar #188810)\*  
26 Alliance Defending Freedom  
27 1000 Hurricane Shoals Rd. NE  
Suite D-1100  
Lawrenceville, GA 30040  
Telephone: (770) 339-0774  
Email: dcortman@adflegal.org

*Attorneys for Plaintiff Cedar Park Assembly of God of  
Kirkland, Washington*

\* Admitted *pro hac vice*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on May 13, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Jeffrey Todd Sprung  
Paul M. Crisalli  
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE  
800 5th Ave  
Ste 2000  
Seattle, WA 98104

Joyce A Roper  
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE  
PO Box 40109  
Olympia, WA 98504

Marta U DeLeon  
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE  
PO Box 40100  
Olympia, WA 98504  
*Counsel for Defendants*

DATED: May 13, 2019

s/Kristen K. Waggoner  
Kristen K. Waggoner (WSBA #27790)  
Kevin H. Theriot (AZ Bar #030446)\*  
Elissa M. Graves (AZ Bar #030670)\*  
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM  
15100 N. 90th Street  
Scottsdale, Arizona 85260  
Telephone: (480) 444-0020  
Facsimile: (480) 444-0025  
Email: kwaggoner@adflegal.org  
ktheriot@adflegal.org  
egraves@adflegal.org

David A. Cortman (GA Bar #188810)\*  
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM  
1000 Hurricane Shoals Rd. NE  
Suite D-1100  
Lawrenceville, GA 30040  
Telephone: (770) 339-0774  
Email: dcortman@adflegal.org

Attorneys for Plaintiff Cedar Park Assembly of God  
of Kirkland, Washington

\* Admitted *pro hac vice*

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