

Honorable Benjamin H. Settle

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF)
KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
MYRON "MIKE" KREIDLER, in his official)
capacity as Insurance Commissioner for the State)
of Washington; JAY INSLEE, in his official)
capacity as Governor of the State of Washington,)
)
Defendants.)

Civil No. 3:19-cv-05181

**PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

NOTING DATE: APRIL 7, 2023

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INTRODUCTION

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2 This case is about whether churches may operate according to their religious beliefs on the
3 sanctity of human life—“free from state interference.” *Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of*
4 *Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.*, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). Cedar Park was free to do so; the
5 Church had a health care plan that provided necessary medical coverage to its employees and their
6 families while excluding elective abortion and abortifacients consistent with its beliefs. SB 6219
7 changed that.¹ The law requires most Washington employers to include abortion and abortifacient-
8 contraceptive coverage in their health plans. And it purposefully contains no religious exception.
9 When churches protested based on their religious belief in the sanctity of human life, the bill’s
10 sponsor did not say that their beliefs were accommodated. The sponsor told churches to sue—
11 indicating SB 6219 *intentionally violated* their beliefs. SB 6219’s real-world effect was exactly
12 what the bill’s sponsor intended. It injured Cedar Park by causing it to lose its conscience-
13 conforming health insurance and forcing it to choose between paying significantly more for an
14 inferior health plan or violating its deeply-held religious convictions.

15 Cedar Park took the only sensible path forward and sued. Now Cedar Park is entitled to
16 judgment as a matter of law under the Free Exercise Clause because the undisputed facts show:
17 (a) the mandated abortion coverage substantially burdens the Church’s religious beliefs by causing
18 it to participate in, facilitate, or pay for abortion (Defendants concede even if the employer chooses
19 to “exclude” services like abortion, “the plan actually provides for access”);² (b) the mandate is
20 neither neutral nor generally applicable, and involves a system of “individualized assessments;”
21 and (c) it interferes with the Church’s ability to conduct its internal affairs consistently with its
22 religious beliefs about abortion, violating the church-autonomy doctrine. As a result, SB 6219, and
23

24
25 ¹ SB 6219, codified at RCW §§ 48.43.072 & .073, states, “if a health *plan* provides coverage for
26 maternity care or services, the health *plan* must also provide a covered person with substantially
equivalent coverage to permit the abortion of a pregnancy.” (emphasis added).

27 ² Sec. Am. Verified Compl. ¶ 46-48, ECF No. 46, as supplemented by ECF No. 52-1 (“VC”);
Tocco Dep., 102 & 105, ECF No. 93-4.

1 Washington’s ineffective and discriminatory Conscience Clause, RCW § 48.45.065 (the
2 “Statutes”), are subject to strict scrutiny—which they cannot survive.

3 STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

4 A. Cedar Park’s religious beliefs prohibit facilitating abortion, directly 5 or indirectly.

6 Cedar Park has served the Bothell and greater Eastside communities of Washington for
7 nearly half a century. Sec. Am. Verified Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 46, as supplemented by ECF No.
8 52-1 (“VC”). The Church is associated with the Assemblies of God, has over 600 members, and
9 hosts about 1,500 people at its weekly services. *Id.* ¶ 19. To serve its congregation and the
10 community, Cedar Park employs a sizeable team and provides health coverage to roughly 140
11 people. Orcutt Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 94-1.

12 Like many churches worldwide, Cedar Park holds and teaches the belief that each human
13 life is sacred from the moment of conception because God formed that life in His own likeness.
14 VC ¶ 24. Cedar Park’s governing documents—its Constitution and Bylaws—enshrine this
15 religious belief:

16 Under the *Imago Dei* principle, all human life is sacred and made by God, in His image.
17 Because all humans are image-bearers, human life is of immeasurable worth in all of its
18 dimensions, including pre-born babies, the aged, the physically or mentally challenged,
19 and every other stage or condition from conception through natural death. As such, we as
20 Christians are called to defend, protect, and value all human life. *Id.* ¶ 25.

21 Abortion violates Cedar Park’s religious belief about the sanctity of human life in several
22 ways. *Id.* ¶ 26. First, Cedar Park believes and teaches that *participating in, facilitating, or paying*
23 *for abortion is a grave sin.* *Id.* ¶ 29. The Church reads the Bible as prohibiting the “intentional
24 destruction of innocent human life,” including abortion. *Id.* ¶ 27. Second, the Church views
25 abortion as incompatible with the dignity God conferred on humankind by making individuals in
26 His image. *Id.* ¶ 28. And third, the Church believes any facilitation of abortion, directly or
27 indirectly, injures its religious mission of recognizing and preserving human life from conception
28 until natural death. *Id.* ¶ 30; Smith Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 50.

1 Cedar Park does not simply believe in the importance of human life—it puts those beliefs
 2 into practice. The Church hosts an annual service known as “Presentation Sunday” in which the
 3 congregation prays for and supports couples experiencing infertility. *Id.* ¶ 34. Cedar Park has also
 4 facilitated about 1,000 embryo adoptions in recent years. *Id.* ¶ 36. To serve the larger community,
 5 the Church partners with a local pregnancy center that supports women experiencing unplanned
 6 pregnancies. *Id.* ¶ 35. Cedar Park even hosted a mobile ultrasound unit on campus so that women
 7 considering abortion could see the unique individual growing inside them. *Id.*

8 Cedar Park only hires employees who agree with and live by the Church’s religious
 9 teachings—including those about the sanctity of human life—at work and in their private lives. *Id.*
 10 ¶ 32. To that end, each church employee signs an agreement to “liv[e] a life that reflects the values,
 11 mission, and faith of Cedar Park.” *Id.* Church employees are barred from engaging in “behavior
 12 that conflicts or appears inconsistent with evangelical Christian standards as determined in the sole
 13 and absolute discretion of Cedar Park.” *Id.*

14 **B. Cedar Park requires a health plan that respects the sanctity of life.**

15 Like all its other programs, Cedar Park’s health plan (prior to SB 6219) affirmed the
 16 Church’s religious belief in the sanctity of human life. VC ¶¶ 39-41. Cedar Park’s group health
 17 plan included comprehensive maternity care (as federal law requires) but excluded abortion
 18 coverage. *Id.* ¶¶ 45-47.³ It seriously violates Cedar Park’s religious beliefs to provide health
 19 coverage that contradicts the Church’s biblical teachings. *Id.* ¶ 41.

20 Health coverage is not just a vital employment benefit, but also one way that Cedar Park
 21 performs its religious duty to care for church employees. *Id.* ¶¶ 40, 83-86. This religious obligation
 22 extends past furthering employees’ spiritual and emotional well-being to protecting their physical
 23 health. *Id.* ¶ 39. A group health insurance plan is Cedar Park’s only viable way to safeguard its
 24

25
 26 ³ Despite its brokers’ assurances to the contrary, Cedar Park learned its health plan actually
 27 included abortifacients just before filing this lawsuit. But it took steps to change that as soon as
 28 possible. VC ¶ 48.

1 employees' health, which is not just a religious calling but a legal obligation under the federal
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). *Id.* ¶¶ 40-42.

3 **C. Cedar Park's health plan was made illegal by SB 6219.**

4 After SB 6219 took effect, Cedar Park's group health insurance plan accommodating its
5 beliefs was no longer legal; self-insurance was and is the only available plan that could comply
6 with Cedar Park's religious beliefs about protecting employees and declining to facilitate abortion.
7 Orcutt Decl. ¶ 9; VC ¶ 43; Orcutt Dep. 39-41, ECF No. 92 at 42-44. But after evaluating self-
8 insurance, Cedar Park discovered that it would cost roughly \$243,125 more annually to become
9 self-insured and that this number was expected to double within a few years due to increased plan
10 use. *Id.* And self-insurance does not provide comparable benefits. It requires Cedar Park to assume
11 100% of the risk of claims exceeding premiums, unlike fully insured plans, which place all risk on
12 the carrier. Orcutt Decl. ¶¶ 19, 21. Moreover, a self-insured plan requires purchasing stop-loss
13 insurance, and Cedar Park would have had trouble being eligible for it after several years of an
14 employee making extremely high claims because of a severely ill child. *Id.* ¶¶ 26-28.

15 The additional cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars more each year for health insurance
16 was unaffordable and would require the church to significantly reduce its other ministries, thus
17 creating an additional free exercise violation. *Id.* Purchasing group health insurance regulated by
18 the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner is the only sustainable way for Cedar
19 Park to keep its religious ministries intact. *Id.*

20 **D. Washington's abortion-coverage mandate.**

21 "Historically, Washington law has not mandated abortion coverage." AG DeLeon May 8,
22 2018, Memo, 2, attached as Ex. 1. But Washington Senate Bill 6219, which was signed into law
23 on June 7, 2018, established new rules for group health plans issued or renewed in 2019 or later
24 by requiring them to include coverage for abortions and abortifacients. *Id.* A health plan that
25 "provides coverage for maternity care or services . . . must also provide a covered person with
26 substantially equivalent coverage to permit the abortion of a pregnancy." VC ¶ 49; RCW §
27

1 48.43.073(1); Wash. Admin. Code § 284-43-7220(2). What’s more, such a health plan generally
2 “may not limit in any way a person’s access to services related to the abortion of a pregnancy.”
3 *Id.*; RCW § 48.43.073(2)(a).

4 Group health plans also must cover (1) “[a]ll contraceptive drugs, devices, and other
5 products, approved by the federal food and drug administration, including over-the-counter
6 contraceptive drugs, devices, and products, approved by the federal food and drug administration,”
7 (2) “[v]oluntary sterilization procedures,” and (3) related “consultations, examinations,
8 procedures, and medical services that are necessary to prescribe, dispense, insert, deliver,
9 distribute, administer, or remove” those items. VC ¶ 50; RCW § 48.43.072(1).

10 Defendants admit that anyone who violates Washington’s abortion-coverage mandate is
11 guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be fined up to \$1,000 and imprisoned up to 364 days,
12 besides other potential penalties. VC ¶ 73; Answer ¶ 73, ECF No. 77; RCW § 48.01.080. Yet
13 Senate Bill 6219 itself contains no exemption for houses of worship or other religious ministries
14 who object to facilitating abortion and abortifacient contraceptives with their health plans. VC ¶
15 51.

16 Disdaining this crisis of conscience, the bill’s sponsor, Senator Steve Hobbs, publicly
17 stated that churches can sue if they do not wish to provide insurance coverage for abortion. *Id.*
18 ¶ 54. And on three separate occasions, the legislature specifically refused to amend SB 6219 to
19 include protection for religious organizations.⁴ State officials thus deliberately targeted houses of
20 worship for mandatory abortion coverage and, in so doing, intentionally violated their religious
21 beliefs about the sanctity of human life. *Id.*

22 At the same time, state officials provided explicit secular exemptions to the abortion-
23 coverage mandate. First, Senate Bill 6219 does not apply to all insurance plans, even if they may
24 cover maternity. It excludes short-term, limited-purpose plans; property/casualty liability plans;

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26 ⁴ SEN. RIVERS, S. Doc. No. S-3824.1/18, available at <https://bit.ly/3IXJGcw>; SEN. O’BAN, S AMD
27 380, available at <https://bit.ly/3YzAffi>; REP. SHEA, H AMD 1311, available at
28 <https://bit.ly/41XVwy7>.

1 supplemental Medicare; and supplemental Tricare. Molly Nollette Dep., 46-61, ECF No. 93-5;
 2 RCW § 48.43.005(29); Beyer Sep. 21, 2018, email to Weeks-Green, attached as Ex. 2 (confirming
 3 that SB 6219 does not apply to disability and short term, limited purpose plans). The Office of the
 4 Insurance Commissioner (“OIC”) regulates all these plans. Nollette Dep., 42-44. Second, the bill’s
 5 abortion-coverage mandate does not apply “to the minimum extent necessary for the state to be in
 6 compliance” with “federal requirements” that are a “condition to the allocation of federal funds to
 7 the state.” VC ¶ 56; RCW § 48.43.073(5). In other words, if federal dollars are at stake,
 8 Washington’s abortion-coverage requirement gives way.

9 **E. SB 6219’s abortion mandate was not prompted by any complaints**
 10 **about a lack of abortion coverage.**

11 The OIC received no complaints about health care plans not covering abortion before
 12 Washington enacted SB 6219. Daniel Dep. 13, attached as Ex. 3. The only pre-SB 6219 complaints
 13 it received about health care plans not covering contraception concerned birth control pills and
 14 vasectomies. *Id.* at 14. Moreover, the state attorney tasked with enforcing insurance regulations is
 15 unaware of any enforcement actions against carriers for failure to cover contraception when SB
 16 6219 was enacted in 2018. Pasarow Dep. 14-15, attached as Ex. 4.

17 Washington’s only interest in passing SB 6219 is “protecting gender equity and women’s
 18 reproductive health,” as explained in the statute’s preamble. Nollette Dep. 74. This interest
 19 generally includes access to reproductive health care regardless of “a woman’s income level” or
 20 “type of insurance.” Ex. A to VC, ECF No. 46-1. Defendants made no attempt to further those
 21 interests through less restrictive means before implementing the abortion-coverage mandate.
 22 Nollette Dep. at 75-76.

23 **F. Washington’s Conscience Clause does not effectively protect, but**
 24 **discriminates against, Cedar Park’s religious beliefs prohibiting**
 25 **facilitating abortion.**

26 Another Washington law, called the Conscience Clause, purports to safeguard conscience
 27 rights in the insurance context. But the protection it affords to houses of worship—and most other
 28 conscientious objectors—is superficial and ineffective. VC ¶ 62; RCW § 48.43.065. From the

1 beginning, § 48.43.065(1) makes clear that conscientious objectors enjoy protection only to the
2 extent there is no impact on employees' ability "to receive the full range of services covered under
3 the [basic health] plan," including abortion services.

4 The only accommodation § 48.43.065 gives houses of worship with religious objections to
5 covering "a specific service" (like abortion) is that they are not required to directly "purchase
6 coverage for that service" from an insurance provider. RCW § 48.43.065(3)(a); *accord* VC ¶ 66.
7 But the Conscience Clause requires a church's insurance carrier to provide indirect "coverage of,
8 and timely access to, any service or services excluded from [an individual's] benefits package [like
9 abortion] as a result of their employer's . . . exercise of the conscience clause." RCW
10 § 48.43.065(3)(b); *accord* VC ¶ 67. In effect, Cedar Park's purchase of a health plan triggers
11 abortion coverage, facilitates abortion, and thus violates the Church's religious beliefs. Cedar
12 Park—like many religious organizations—objects "to paying for, facilitating access to, or
13 providing insurance coverage for abortion or abortifacient contraceptives *under any*
14 *circumstance.*" VC ¶ 78 (emphasis added). It does not matter whether the payment or facilitation
15 of abortion is direct or indirect: if abortion coverage results from the Church's health plan as it
16 does in this case, it violates Cedar Park's religious beliefs. Smith Decl. ¶ 6.

17 Even worse, abortion coverage is *actually part* of Cedar Park's plan. The government
18 official in charge of reviewing health plan filings for legal compliance testified that notice of how
19 to obtain abortion or abortifacients is contained "in the *plan* documents," and even if the employer
20 chooses to "exclude" services like abortion, "the *plan* actually provides for access." Tocco Dep.,
21 12, 102 & 105 (emphasis added); *see also* Orcutt Dep. 42-43 ("It is my understanding from my
22 discussions with Jami [our insurance broker] that even if we—if we expressed our desire to not
23 cover abortions or specific contraceptives, they would be included in our plan."). Tellingly,
24 enrollees in group or level-funded health plans use *the same insurance card* to obtain abortifacients
25 as non-objectionable drugs. Orcutt Decl. ¶ 12 (citing August 8, 2010, email from Hansen to Orcutt,
26 ECF No. 92 at 216).

1 Moreover, § 48.43.065 allows insurance providers to charge churches for abortion
2 coverage even if those costs are purportedly excluded, as “[n]othing in this section requires a health
3 carrier . . . to provide any health care services without appropriate payment of premium or fee.”
4 RCW § 48.43.065(4); *accord* VC ¶ 63. In other words, Washington’s Conscience Clause is a fig
5 leaf that magnifies—rather than mitigates—Cedar Park’s religious harm. It requires insurance
6 providers to provide objectionable abortion and abortifacient-contraceptive coverage either as a
7 part of, or a result of, Cedar Park’s group health plan, then authorizes insurance providers to charge
8 Cedar Park for that abortion coverage. VC ¶¶ 70-71; Tocco Dep., 111 (carriers can still charge a
9 premium for services an employer objects to but the carrier provides). Adding insult to injury,
10 Defendants admit that insurance providers may pull off this sleight of hand by increasing Cedar
11 Park’s premiums through characterizing the cost of objectional services (like abortion) as
12 “overhead.” VC ¶ 71; Answer ¶ 71; *see also* Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. 2002 No. 5, Interpretation of
13 “Conscientious Objection” Statute Allowing Employers to Refrain from Including Certain Items
14 in the Employee Health Care Benefit Package (Aug. 8, 2002), <https://bit.ly/3fzu14B>. Defendants
15 also concede the carrier could facilitate that coverage by distributing the risk to all or some
16 members of the group health plan, or through a third party. *See* MTD Reply 10, ECF No. 95. Any
17 of these ways violate Cedar Park’s religious beliefs, as the result is the same: the Church’s purchase
18 of a group health plan facilitates the provision of objectionable abortion services to plan
19 participants they otherwise would lack.

20 But Washington law does not deprive every employer of true conscience protection.
21 Section 48.43.065(2)(a) safeguards health care providers, religiously sponsored health carriers,
22 and health care facilities from being “required by law or contract in any circumstances to
23 participate in the *provision of or payment of* a specific service [like abortion] if they object to so
24 doing for reason of conscience or religion.” (emphasis added); *accord* VC ¶ 104; Tocco Dep. 74-
25 75 (§ 48.43.065(2)(a) protects health care providers from having to pay for care they object to);
26 Nollette Dep. 64 (Both subsections 2 and 3 of § 48.43.065 protect religious health care providers
27
28

1 and facilities from having to pay for objectionable health care service like abortion and
 2 contraception). Religious health care providers, health carriers, and health care facilities are thus
 3 completely exempt from including abortion coverage in their employee health plans. VC ¶ 104.
 4 Neither must religiously sponsored health carriers include abortion coverage in the plans they offer
 5 to others. All they must do is inform enrollees of the services they refuse to cover and ensure those
 6 enrollees have prompt access to written information about how they may directly access those
 7 services in an expeditious manner. *Id.*; RCW § 48.43.065(2)(b).

8 In sum, Washington offers real conscience protection to health care providers, religiously
 9 sponsored health carriers, and health care facilities. These religious entities need not include
 10 objectionable services like abortion in their own employee health plans or otherwise facilitate
 11 objectionable abortion coverage in any circumstance. VC ¶ 66. Yet because Cedar Park is a church
 12 and not a health care entity, Washington forces it to (at best) indirectly facilitate abortion as a result
 13 of its health plan, and authorizes insurance providers to charge Cedar Park for this abortion
 14 coverage, in violation of the Church's beliefs. VC ¶ 70.

15 **G. Washington's abortion-coverage mandate compels Cedar Park's**
 16 **health plan to facilitate abortion.**

17 Cedar Park offers its employees a health plan with comprehensive maternity coverage for
 18 religious reasons and because the ACA requires the Church to do so. VC ¶¶ 77-80; *accord* 26
 19 U.S.C. § 4980H; 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(D). Otherwise, Cedar Park faces crippling fines of up
 20 to \$100 per plan participant for each day it fails to comply. VC ¶ 81; 26 U.S.C. § 4980D. Just as
 21 the Washington Legislature anticipated, the Church's group health plan automatically triggers
 22 Senate Bill 6219's abortion-coverage requirement. *Id.*

23 As a result, Cedar Park's insurance provider, Kaiser Permanente, informed the Church on
 24 August 14, 2019, that due to SB 6219 it would directly include abortion coverage in the Church's
 25 health plan, set to renew on September 1, 2019. Suppl. VC ¶ 48.1. In fact, because of SB 6219,
 26 Kaiser offers no abortion exclusions to fully insured groups like Cedar Park, whether under §
 27 48.43.065 or otherwise. *Id.* ¶ 48.2.

1 But that does not mean Kaiser Permanente objects to the kind of policy Cedar Park needs
2 to reflect its religious beliefs. To the contrary, Kaiser expressed its willingness to eliminate
3 abortion coverage from Cedar Park’s health plan mid-year if this court enjoins Senate Bill 6219’s
4 application to houses of worship. *Id.* ¶ 48.3. Without an injunction, accommodating Cedar Park’s
5 religious beliefs about the sanctity of human life poses too great a risk to Kaiser and other
6 nonreligious health insurers, subjecting them to SB 6219’s harsh penalties.

7 In short, as a direct result of Washington enacting SB 6219, Kaiser Permanente inserted
8 abortion coverage into Cedar Park’s health plan. *Id.* ¶ 48.2. That insertion violated Cedar Park’s
9 religious beliefs. Cedar Park unsuccessfully tried to mitigate this violation by searching for
10 replacement coverage. Orcutt Decl. ¶¶ 9, 19, 21. But to ensure that Cedar Park’s employees did
11 not experience a devastating lapse in health coverage, the Church was forced to renew its modified
12 plan under protest. Suppl. VC ¶ 48.2.

13 ARGUMENT

14 Summary judgment is required when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
15 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The party moving
16 for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying evidence in the record that shows no
17 genuine issue of material fact exists. *T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n*, 809
18 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

19 As shown above, it is undisputed that (1) the Church’s religious beliefs prohibit facilitating
20 abortion or abortifacients in any circumstance, (2) SB 6219 resulted in Cedar Park losing its health
21 plan that accommodated those beliefs, (3) Cedar Park no longer has access to a comparable health
22 plan that meets its religious convictions, and (4) the Conscience Clause’s limited protection also
23 requires abortion facilitation and discriminates against churches. So Defendants must now put
24 forth “*specific facts* showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Id.* If the case involves a “mixed
25 question of fact and law and the only disputes relate to the legal significance of undisputed facts,
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1 the controversy collapses into a question of law suitable to disposition on summary judgment.”
 2 *Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n*, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003).

3 **I. The Statutes violate Free Exercise because it is undisputed that they facilitate**
 4 **abortion access and contain exceptions eliminating neutrality and general**
 5 **applicability, subjecting them to strict scrutiny.**

6 The Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from imposing “special disabilities on
 7 the basis of religious views or religious status.” *Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith*, 494
 8 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).⁵ “Bad motive may be one way to pursue a violation, but first and foremost,
 9 *Smith-Lukumi* is about objectively unequal treatment of religion and analogous secular activities.”
 10 Douglas Laycock, *Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:*
 11 *Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 210 (2004). Laws that
 12 burden religiously motivated conduct are subject to strict scrutiny if they are not generally
 13 applicable or not religiously neutral. *Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S.
 14 520, 546 (1993). The Statutes fail both tests.

15
 16 **A. The Statutes impose an impermissible burden on Cedar Park’s**
 17 **exercise of religion by coercing the Church to facilitate access to**
 18 **abortion and abortifacients.**

19 To trigger Free Exercise Clause protection, Cedar Park need only show that the Statutes
 20 burden its religion. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 531. SB 6219 burdens Cedar Park’s free exercise of
 21 religion by coercing it to facilitate abortion as a result of offering a group health plan. This is a
 22 prototypical substantial burden. *E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores*, 573 U.S. 682, 720-22
 23 (2014) (requiring companies to cover abortifacients in their employee health insurance plans
 24 substantially burdened their religious beliefs not to facilitate abortion); *Skyline Wesleyan Church*

25
 26 ⁵ *Smith* should be overruled. *See Fulton v. City of Phila., Pa.*, 141 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021) (Barrett,
 27 J., joined by Kavanaugh, J., concurring) and *id.* at 1924 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., and
 28 Gorsuch, J.). Cedar Park acknowledges that this Court lacks the authority to overrule *Smith*, but
 preserves that argument for a future appeal, if necessary.

1 v. *Cal. Dep't of Managed Health Care*, 968 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2020) (church “suffered an
2 injury in fact” when California mandated “immediate[]” coverage of elective abortion in violation
3 of the church’s beliefs); *Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland v. Kreidler*, 860 Fed. App’x
4 542, 543 (2021) (same).

5 Because Cedar Park believes that abortion ends a life, the Church teaches that participating
6 in, facilitating, or paying for abortion in any circumstance is a grave sin. This includes indirect
7 payments such as increased premiums, or abortion coverage triggered by the Church’s plan, even
8 if it is not included within the plan. VC ¶ 29; Smith Decl. ¶ 6. That belief is constitutionally
9 protected. For example, even submitting an accommodation request substantially burdened
10 religious business owners’ beliefs because it “trigger[ed] the provision of objectionable coverage
11 by their [third party administrator], making them complicit in conduct that violates their religious
12 beliefs.” *Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Services*, 801 F.3d 927, 938-41
13 (8th Cir. 2015), *vacated on other grounds*, 2016 WL 2842448 (May 16, 2016). “That they
14 themselves do not have to arrange for or pay for objectionable contraceptive coverage is not
15 determinative of whether the required or forbidden act is not religiously offensive.” *Id.* at 942.

16 Moreover, the undisputed facts show that, unless they self-insure with a more expensive
17 yet inferior policy, SB 6219 requires Cedar Park’s group health plan to cover abortion and
18 abortion causing drugs. The statute itself dictates: “A health *plan* issued or renewed on or after
19 January 1, 2019, shall provide coverage for all contraceptive drugs,” including abortifacients,
20 and “if a health *plan* provides coverage for maternity care or services, the health *plan* must also
21 provide a covered person with substantially equivalent coverage to permit the abortion of a
22 pregnancy.” RCW §§ 48.43.072(1)(a) and .073(1) (cleaned up & emphasis added). Defendants’
23 30(b)(6) witness and the insight provided by Cedar Park’s insurance broker confirm the statute is
24 applied so that abortion is included in its plan, even if Cedar Park objects. *Tocco Dep.*, 102 & 105
25 (“the plan actually provides for access”); *Orcutt Dep.* 42-43; *Orcutt Decl.* ¶ 12.

1 The exemption in RCW § 48.43.065(3) does not alleviate this burden because it specifically
 2 provides that “[t]he provisions of this section shall not result in an enrollee being denied coverage
 3 of, and timely access to, any service or services excluded from their benefits package as a result
 4 of their employer’s or another individual’s exercise of the conscience clause.” *Id.* at 3(b). It also
 5 intensifies the religious burden by discriminating among religious organizations, as the
 6 Conscience Clause completely exempts religious health care providers and entities. *Supra* Facts
 7 § F. Worse still, the Conscience Clause authorizes insurance carriers to increase Cedar Park’s
 8 premiums to cover the cost of abortions even if abortion coverage is not expressly included in the
 9 Church’s plan. *Id.* Accordingly, SB 6219 renders “unlawful the religious practice itself,” by
 10 requiring Cedar Park to facilitate insurance coverage for abortion under threat of criminal liability
 11 and jail time. *See Braunfeld v. Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). That is a substantial burden.

12 **B. The Statutes are subject to strict scrutiny because they are neither**
 13 **neutral nor generally applicable.**

14 The Statutes violate the Free Exercise Clause under the *Smith* test because they: (1) exempt
 15 secular conduct, but not similar religious conduct, *Tandon v. Newsom*, 141 S.Ct. 1294, 1296
 16 (2021); (2) are gerrymandered to single out religious conduct for disfavored treatment, *Lukumi*,
 17 508 U.S. at 532-40; (3) discriminate among religions or types of religious organizations, *Id.* at
 18 536; and/or (4) were enacted with discriminatory intent or hostility toward religious conduct,
 19 *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n*, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1729-31 (2018).

20 **1. The Statutes provide exemptions that undermine the**
 21 **Defendants’ stated interest in providing women access to**
 22 **health benefits.**

23 **a. Categorical exemptions**

24 SB 6219 is not generally applicable because it has secular exemptions that significantly
 25 undermine the Defendants’ stated interest in providing women better access to health benefits.
 26 Even a single exemption that undermines a state’s asserted interest eliminates general
 27 applicability. “Government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore
 28

1 trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, whenever they treat *any* comparable secular
 2 activity more favorably than religious exercise.” *Tandon*, 141 S.Ct. at 1296 (California’s
 3 restriction on at-home religious worship services was not neutral and generally applicable because
 4 it had exemptions for comparable secular activities like hair salons, movie theaters, and
 5 restaurants); *accord Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S.Ct. 63, 66-67 (2020)
 6 (New York’s attendance cap on houses of worship was not neutral and generally applicable
 7 because it treated schools and factories more favorably); *Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge*
 8 *No. 12 v. City of Newark*, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.) (striking down a prohibition
 9 on police officers growing beards for religious reasons because a medical exemption was
 10 allowed); *Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside*, 366 F.3d 1214, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2004)
 11 (single exemption for clubs and lodges to zoning district limited to retail shopping “violates the
 12 principles of neutrality and general applicability because private clubs and lodges endanger [the
 13 town’s] interest in retail synergy as much or more than churches and synagogues”).

14 There are numerous secular exemptions here. Washington law exempts 13 different types
 15 of insurance plans from the definition of “health plans.” RCW § 48.43.005(31). These include
 16 plans that the abortion mandate would otherwise govern because they cover maternity and
 17 abortifacients like short term, limited purpose plans; property/casualty liability plans;
 18 supplemental Medicare; and supplemental Tricare. *Nollette Dep.*, 46-61.⁶ SB 6219 also allows
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20 ⁶ Nollette testified that the short term, limited purpose plans, and property/casualty liability plans
 21 could cover maternity. *Nollette Dep.*, 53-54; 58-59. She also testified that the supplemental plans
 22 cover maternity and contraception if it is covered by “the base plan.” *Id.* at 46-48; 60-61. Medicare
 23 covers maternity and Tricare covers both maternity and contraception. *Does Medicare Cover*
 24 *Pregnancy?*, MEDICARE.ORG, <http://bit.ly/3ZPS5HJ> (last visited March 9, 2023) (noting “All
 25 pregnancy-related care you get when you are formally admitted into the hospital is covered by
 26 Original Medicare Part A hospital insurance. Medicare Part B covers all doctors’ visits and other
 27 outpatient services and tests related to your pregnancy.”); *Maternity (Pregnancy) Care, Covered*
 28 *Services*, TRICARE.MIL, <http://bit.ly/3IYMV5z> (last visited March 9, 2023) (noting “TRICARE
 covers all medically-necessary pregnancy care”); *Over-the-Counter Drugs and Supplies, Covered*
Services, TRICARE.MIL, <http://bit.ly/3ymtTBo> (last visited Feb. 16, 2023) (noting “TRICARE
 covers some over-the-counter (OTC) drugs and supplies. . . . Levonorgestrel (Plan B One-Step
 Emergency Contraceptive) is covered without a prescription from your doctor.”).

1 for an exemption to the abortion mandate if necessary to avoid violating federal conditions on
2 state funding, and exempts plans that do not provide comprehensive maternity care coverage.
3 RCW § 48.43.073(1) & (5). And Washington law completely exempts insurance plans provided
4 by religious health care organizations from the abortion insurance requirement. RCW §
5 48.43.065(2)(a); Tocco Dep. 74-75; Nollette Dep. 64. These exemptions undermine Defendants’
6 purpose of protecting women’s access to reproductive health care. SB 6219, ECF No. 46-1;
7 Nollette Dep. 73 (SB 6219 preamble contains all the state interests for the law). If exempting
8 religious organizations like Cedar Park from paying for abortion undercuts that purpose, so does
9 exempting other plans that cover maternity and contraception. The same is true for plans that do
10 not cover maternity care or are provided by religious health care organizations.

11 Importantly, any independent secular reasons for exempting these plans are irrelevant. The
12 City of Hialeah had an independent, secular public-health interest in regulating disposal of
13 garbage from restaurants. Yet the Court held the city ordinance’s failure to restrict restaurant
14 garbage the same way it did animal sacrifice rendered it underinclusive and not generally
15 applicable. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 544-45. Otherwise, “the requirement of general applicability
16 [would be] entirely vacuous...[because] every law is generally applicable to whatever it applies
17 to.” *Laycock*, 118 HAV. L. REV. at 207.

18 “[C]ategories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect
19 of burdening religious practice.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 542. That is because a law “lacks general
20 applicability if it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines
21 the government’s asserted interest in a similar way.” *Fulton*, 141 S.Ct. at 1878. SB 6219’s asserted
22 health interests are undermined by the plans cited above, which are categorically exempted. There
23 is no reason why the State is any less interested in access to health care for women who only have
24 plans for a limited purpose or amount of time, have a supplemental plan, or work for an employer
25 that does not cover maternity or for a religious health care organization. By failing to offer the
26 same exemption to religious plans like Cedar Park’s, whose plan participations are much less
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1 likely to seek a surgical abortion or use abortifacients, Defendants make the unconstitutional value
2 judgment that secular reasons for not covering abortion are important enough to overcome the
3 State's interest in women's health, but religious beliefs are not.

4 **b. Individualized exemptions**

5 The government may not withhold a religious exemption without compelling reason
6 "where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions." *Fulton*, 141 S.Ct. at 1877. In
7 *Fulton*, the City of Philadelphia had refused to contract with Catholic Social Services (CSS) for
8 foster care services unless the organization agreed to certify same-sex couples as foster parents in
9 violation of its beliefs. *Id.* at 1875-76. The city invoked the contract's nondiscrimination
10 provision, claiming that it categorically prohibited CSS from declining to certify same-sex
11 couples based on its religious beliefs. *Id.* at 1875. But exceptions from the nondiscrimination
12 provision were available at the city's "sole discretion." *Id.* at 1878. That discretion, the Court
13 held, created "a system of individual exemptions," making the nondiscrimination provision not
14 generally applicable. *Id.*

15 SB 6219 exempts plans from the abortion mandate if necessary to avoid violating federal
16 conditions on state funding, and in doing so allows for individualized exemptions like Philadelphia
17 did in *Fulton*. RCW § 48.43.073(5). For example, the Weldon Amendment restricts federal
18 funding to states that discriminate against health plans refusing to cover abortion. Philhower
19 Memorandum to Nollette at 2, attached as Ex. 5. So Defendants exempt plans from SB 6219's
20 abortion mandate if there is a Weldon Amendment problem, but they have no process governing
21 that determination. Nollette Dep. at 29-30 ("If the office were concerned about a possible Weldon
22 Amendment issue, we would contact our attorney"). That dilemma is assessed on a case-by-case
23 basis at the sole discretion of Defendants. *Id.* at 30; Ex. 1 at 7 ("because the language of the savings
24 clause in SB 6219 requires an exemption 'to the minimum extent possible,' the OIC has authority
25 and *discretion* to choose how to implement this exemption" (emphasis added)).
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1 Similarly, the State of California’s abortion mandate was subject to strict scrutiny under
2 the Free Exercise Clause because the director’s “discretion” to allow exemptions was not governed
3 by “any written rules, policies, or procedures for requesting an exemption.” *Foothill v. Watanabe*,
4 __ F.Supp.3d __ (2022), 2022 WL 3684900 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2022). And just like the OIC official
5 here, when asked about whether she would approve a plan without abortion, the California state
6 official said “she would need to consult with DMHC attorneys.” *Id.* at *8. That discretion makes
7 SB 6219 subject to strict scrutiny, just as the court held in *Foothill*.

8 **2. The Statutes are not neutral in their operation.**

9 “Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one
10 requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 531.
11 SB 6219 and RCW § 48.43.065 are not neutral because they are gerrymandered to limit religious
12 objections, treat religious health care related companies more favorably than churches, or target
13 conscientious objectors like Cedar Park.

14 **a. SB 6219 is impermissibly gerrymandered.**

15 Whether a law has the impermissible objective of suppressing religious belief is not
16 assessed only facially, but also from “the effect of a law in its real operation.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S.
17 at 535. A law is impermissibly gerrymandered against religious organizations like Cedar Park if
18 it favors secular conduct, *id.* at 537, or “proscribe[s] more religious conduct than is necessary to
19 achieve [its] stated ends.” *Id.* at 538. SB 6219 suffers from both fatal flaws.

20 By offering multiple secular exemptions, Washington has failed to pursue its proffered
21 objectives “with respect to analogous non-religious conduct,” *See Id.* at 546. The First
22 Amendment prevents Cedar Park and other similarly situated organizations from “being singled
23 out for discriminatory treatment,” including Defendants’ refusal to grant them an exemption that
24 would not adversely affect the government’s stated interest more than the secular exemptions the
25 state already gives. *Id.* at 538. Providing secular exemptions “while refusing religious exemptions
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1 is sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to trigger heightened scrutiny under *Smith*
2 and *Lukumi*.” *Fraternal Ord. of Police*, 170 F.3d at 365.

3 SB 6219 also proscribes more conduct than is necessary to achieve its end of furthering
4 women’s access to abortion. *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 542 (law hindering “much more religious
5 conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in [its] defense,” is “not
6 neutral.”). Exempting Cedar Park would primarily affect the church’s employees, all of whom
7 share the Church’s beliefs about abortion. *See* VC ¶¶ 25-32. Forcing Cedar Park to provide
8 abortion coverage that its employees will not use makes SB 6219 broader than necessary and
9 impermissibly gerrymandered. And it lacks any (non-discriminatory) rational basis.

10 **b. RCW § 48.43.065 treats churches less favorably than**
11 **other religious organizations.**

12 A second way to prove a law is not neutral is to show that it produces “differential treatment
13 of two religions.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 536. Treating different types of religious organizations
14 disparately is sufficient. There is no need to show the government favors one creed over another.
15 *E.g., Larson v. Valente*, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (striking law treating “well-established
16 churches” more favorably than “churches which are new”).

17 SB 6219 is part of the same statutory scheme as Washington’s Conscience Clause, RCW
18 § 48.43.065. Together, these laws require insurance carriers to cover abortion pursuant to SB
19 6219 even if Cedar Park objects, while completely exempting health care related religious
20 organizations. And, worse still, the statute authorizes the carrier to charge Cedar Park for abortion
21 coverage indirectly. *Supra* Facts § F. Cedar Park objects to facilitating abortion both directly and
22 indirectly, even if it is not technically part of the plan it purchased. Smith Decl. ¶ 6. Because of
23 this disparate treatment, Cedar Park’s insurer has refused to exempt Cedar Park, and instead
24 requires the Church to *directly cover* abortion. *Id.* ¶¶ 3-4.

25 This “disparate treatment” is “striking.” *Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn*, 141 S.Ct. at
26 66. Religious health care providers, health carriers, and health care facilities that have a
27 conscientious or moral objection to providing insurance coverage for abortion are completely

1 exempt and not subject to possible indirect fees. *Supra* Facts § F. Cedar Park is not, eliminating
 2 RCW § 48.43.065’s neutrality. *Masterpiece*, 138 S.Ct. at 1731 (“The Free Exercise Clause bars
 3 even subtle departures from neutrality on matters of religion.” (cleaned up)).

4 **c. SB 6219 intentionally discriminates against religious**
 5 **organizations like Cedar Park.**

6 Discriminatory intent is not necessary to show lack of neutrality, but it can show an anti-
 7 religious objective. “[U]pon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from
 8 animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own
 9 high duty to the Constitution and the rights it secures.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 547. “Factors relevant
 10 to the assessment of governmental neutrality include the historical background of the decision
 11 under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in
 12 question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements
 13 made by members of the decisionmaking body.” *Masterpiece*, 138 S.Ct. at 1731 (cleaned up).

14 Washington legislators attempted to amend SB 6219 to add exemptions for religious
 15 organizations like Cedar Park, but those three separate proposals were rejected.⁷ Moreover,
 16 Washington State Senator Steve Hobbs, SB 6219’s sponsor, stated that religious organizations
 17 can sue if they do not want to provide insurance coverage for abortion.⁸ Responding to religious
 18 organizations’ concern that SB 6219 would compel them to pay for abortions, Senator Hobbs
 19 quipped: “Health care is about the individual, not about [religious organizations].” *Id.* The
 20 legislative history rejecting religious exemptions shows SB 6219 targets religious organizations
 21 that believe in the sanctity of life.

22 This lack of neutrality along with the numerous exemptions outlined above make SB 6219
 23 neither neutral nor generally applicable. It is thus subject to strict scrutiny.

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 26 ⁷ *Supra* n.4.

27 ⁸ Matt Markovich, *Catholic Bishops of Wash. ask Gov. Inslee to Veto Abortion Insurance Bill*,
 KOMO NEWS (March 5, 2018), <https://bit.ly/2Uuu5Nf>.

1 **C. The Statutes fail strict scrutiny.**

2 Under strict scrutiny, “a law restrictive of religious practice must advance interests of the
3 highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at
4 546 (cleaned up). “Rather than rely on broadly formulated interests, courts must scrutinize the
5 asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. The question,
6 then, is not whether the [government] has a compelling interest in enforcing its . . . policies
7 generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to” Cedar Park. *Fulton*, 141
8 S.Ct. at 1881 (cleaned up).

9 **1. The Statutes do not serve a rational, much less compelling,
10 government interest.**

11 First, Washington must “identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of solving.” *Brown v. Ent.*
12 *Merchs. Ass’n*, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). It has not done so. The OIC received no complaints
13 about health care plans not covering abortion before the State enacted SB 6219. Daniel Dep. 13.
14 And the only pre-SB 6219 complaints it received about health care plans not covering
15 contraception concerned birth control pills and vasectomies. Daniel Dep. 14. Cedar Park does not
16 object to covering either of these.

17 Moreover, SB 6219’s variety of secular exemptions prove it “does not advance an interest
18 of the highest order [because] it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest
19 unprohibited.” *Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue*, 140 S.Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020). (cleaned up).
20 An interest is not compelling when the government “fails to enact feasible measures to restrict
21 other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort.” *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at
22 546-47. The underinclusiveness of SB 6219 demonstrated above in § I.B “is alone enough to
23 defeat” the state’s asserted interest. *Brown*, 564 U.S. at 802; *see also Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 546-47.

24 For example, in *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, 546 U.S.
25 418 (2006), there was no exception to the government’s ban on hallucinogenic tea. But a single
26 exemption for peyote in another part of the controlled substances law showed no compelling
27 interest in banning hallucinogenic tea because both substances undermined the government’s

1 asserted interest. The many exemptions to SB 6219 far exceed the one exception in *O Centro*. So
2 the state must show that “granting the requested religious accommodations would seriously
3 compromise its ability to administer the program.” *Id.* at 435. It cannot do so because Washington
4 itself has “seriously compromised” SB 6219’s universality through multiple exemptions. And the
5 only people affected by an exemption for Cedar Park would be its employees, all of whom share
6 the Church’s beliefs about abortion. *See* VC ¶¶ 25-32. The government does not have a rational—
7 much less compelling—interest in forcing a pro-life church to provide insurance coverage for
8 abortion to people who will not use it.

9 The government has no compelling interest to support the differential treatment of religious
10 objectors in RCW § 48.43.065 either. There is no valid interest in exempting religious hospitals
11 but discriminating against non-health care religious organizations like Cedar Park. Both types of
12 religious organizations have employees covered by insurance and there is no logical difference
13 between them. There is no rational reason to allow carriers to charge Cedar Park extra fees for the
14 very coverage to which it objects while totally exempting the myriad religious health care
15 providers in Washington from providing that same coverage with no risk of the carrier charging
16 them.

17 2. The Statutes are not narrowly tailored.

18 “A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of
19 the evil it seeks to remedy.” *Frisby v. Schultz*, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (cleaned up). Under strict
20 scrutiny, the government must also show the law “is the least restrictive means of achieving” its
21 interests. *Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div.*, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). If means less
22 burdensome on religious freedom exist, the government “must use [them].” *United States v.*
23 *Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc.*, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).

24 Washington has many ways to accomplish its asserted interests without compelling
25 churches to violate their beliefs. First, it could provide all religious organizations an exemption
26 from SB 6219 that does not require their carriers to provide objectionable coverage or permit
27

1 charging them higher premiums. This would allow the government to enforce the law against those
2 who do not object based on religion, while respecting the religious beliefs of churches like Cedar
3 Park. The government has already demonstrated it can do this. Washington excuses religious
4 health care providers, religiously sponsored health carriers, and religious health care facilities from
5 the possibility of facilitating abortion coverage in any way. RCW § 48.43.065(2)(a); *accord Hobby*
6 *Lobby*, 573 U.S. at 730-31 (noting that the government had shown its ability to provide an
7 exemption to the Petitioners because it had granted such an exemption to a different class of
8 religious objectors). Allowing religious objectors like Cedar Park to assert the exemption afforded
9 to religious health care providers would also eliminate the differential treatment in RCW §
10 48.43.065.

11 Moreover, Washington law completely exempts 13 different types of health care plans by
12 excluding them from the definition of “health plan.” RCW § 48.43.005(31). Defendants could
13 extend this provision to Cedar Park and other similarly situated religious employers. *See Foothill*,
14 2022 WL 3684900 at *11 (holding California could more narrowly further its interest in its
15 abortion mandate by creating an exemption for “employers who provide coverage to employees
16 who share their religious beliefs”). Finally, the government itself could provide abortion coverage
17 directly to employees whose health plans exclude coverage of abortion. Washington already has a
18 fund to cover the costs of abortion for insureds with religious insurance carrier policies that exempt
19 that procedure. *See Nollette Dep.* at 65-72 (describing Department of Health process for paying
20 for abortions of individuals with insurance plans that do not cover abortion, using state money
21 funded by a “health equity fee” paid by the objecting carrier).

22 All these options are “workable,” *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003), and much
23 “less restrictive” of religious freedom, *Playboy*, 529 U.S. at 824. The Statutes therefore are not
24 narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means, and they fail strict scrutiny.

1 **D. SB 6219 fails to respect rights of conscience rooted in the Religion**
 2 **Clauses.**

3 SB 6219 does not respect the rights of conscience rooted in the Religion Clauses and
 4 repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court. In *Thomas*, the Court protected an employee’s religious
 5 conviction not to participate in taking human life by making weapons of war. 450 U.S. at 714.
 6 That holding furthered First Amendment protection of religious liberty and government neutrality.
 7 *Id.* at 718-20.

8 *Smith* did not overrule *Thomas* but distinguished it because the regulation challenged was
 9 not “an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct.” 494 U.S. at. 884.
 10 The Free Exercise Clause does not permit the government to require churches to violate their
 11 deeply rooted practice of conforming personnel policies to religious teaching. For example, “[t]he
 12 contention that *Smith* forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion
 13 Clauses has no merit.” *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.*, 565 U.S.
 14 171, 190 (2012). Likewise, Defendants cannot coerce Cedar Park to facilitate abortion through its
 15 health care plan.
 16

17 **II. The undisputed facts show the Statutes violate Cedar Park’s religious**
 18 **autonomy.**

19 Religious organizations’ fundamental right to autonomy predates our nation’s founding.
 20 The very reason Puritans fled to America was to establish their own religious autonomy and free
 21 themselves from the control of the Church of England. *Hosanna-Tabor*, 565 U.S. at 182-83. James
 22 Madison, “the leading architect of the religion clauses,” explained those First Amendment
 23 provisions were designed and adopted, in part, to thwart “political interference with religious
 24 affairs.” *Id.* at 184 (cleaned up).

25 SB 6219 impermissibly interferes with Cedar Park’s internal operations in violation of the
 26 First Amendment doctrine of church autonomy. History teaches—and our Constitution
 27

1 recognizes—that religious liberty demands freedom from government interference with the
 2 internal affairs of religious institutions. *Watson v. Jones*, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871). *Smith*
 3 acknowledged the continuing validity of earlier cases protecting a church’s right to institutional
 4 autonomy. *Smith*, 494 U.S. at 877 (1990). And *Hosanna-Tabor* did the same. 565 U.S. at 190;
 5 *accord Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer*, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2021 n.2 (2017).
 6 First Amendment protection includes “church administration,” *Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.*
 7 *Milivojevich*, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976), “internal organization,” *id.* at 713, and “the operation of .
 8 . . . churches,” *Kedroff*, 344 U.S. at 107-108. In sum, churches have the power to decide for
 9 themselves matters of church governance as well as those of faith and doctrine. *Id.* at 116. “[C]ivil
 10 courts exercise no jurisdiction” in matters affecting church autonomy which spans issues involving
 11 “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
 12 members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” *Watson*, 80 U.S. at 733. In
 13 other words, the First Amendment broadly protects religious institutions “from secular control or
 14 manipulation.” *Kedroff*, 344 U.S. at 116.

15 SB 6219’s abortion mandate interferes with the ability of Washington churches like Cedar
 16 Park to teach their members, live by, and govern their employees according to their religious
 17 doctrine. Before SB 6219, churches and religious organizations could freely ensure the integrity
 18 of their teaching and practice by declining to facilitate abortion insurance coverage. After SB 6219,
 19 churches must choose between their legal obligations and their faith. They cannot meet both
 20 without spending more money for inferior health protection that will also limit its ministry.

21 This blatantly and seriously interferes with Cedar Park’s internal administration and
 22 operations. SB 6219 therefore violates the church autonomy doctrine and is unconstitutional.

23 CONCLUSION

24 The undisputed facts show SB 6219’s abortion mandate and the Conscience Clause violate
 25 Cedar Park’s free exercise rights. The Court should grant the Church’s motion for summary
 26
 27
 28

1 judgment, declare SB 6219 and the Conscience Clause unconstitutional, and enjoin Defendants
2 from applying those statutes to Cedar Park and others similarly situated.

3
4 Respectfully submitted this 9th day of March, 2023,

5 *s/Kevin H. Theriot*

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 9, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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